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Abstract 
The domain name system translates human friendly web addresses to a computer readable internet 
protocol address.  This basic infrastructure is insecure and can be manipulated.  Deployment of 
technology to secure the DNS system has been slow, reaching about 20% of all web sites based in the 
USA.  Little is known about the efforts hospitals and health systems make to secure the domain name 
system for their websites.  To investigate the prevalence of implementing Domain Name System 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC), we analyzed the websites of the 210 public hospitals in the state of 
Illinois, USA.  Only one Illinois hospital website was found to have implemented DNSSEC by December, 
2017. 
Introduction 
The domain name system (DNS) translates a human friendly web address (www.google.com) to an 
internet protocol (IP) address (172.217.23.132).  The DNS infrastructure is insecure and is subject to 
manipulation that can result in redirection and interception of web traffic.  This vulnerability has been 
used for denial of service (DOS) attacks, silent redirection to another website, and man in the middle 
attacks (Liu, 2017; Fulton, S.  2015; Vamosi, 2011; Borgwart et al., 2015, Wang, 2015, Anagnostopoulos 
et al., 2013).   
These attack methodologies can be uses to deny access to services, obtain login credentials or other 
personal information, capture information viewed over the connection, and manipulate data (Fulton, S.  
2015; Geer, 2015, Borgwart et al., 2015).  These risks are particularly important for healthcare 
information because of the potential to delay, deny, and interfere with the delivery of medical services 
in addition to the potential of identity theft.  
These risks can be mitigated by implementing Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) to 
secure the relationship between a web address and an internet protocol address in a verifiable manner 
(Williamson, 2015;  Sample and Karamanian, 2015). This system allows verification that communication 
is occurring directly with the correct receiver. 
Implementation of DNSSEC has expanded in recent years due to concerns of cybercrime and 
cyberwarfare.  Data published in November, 2017 showed that 24% of all websites and 90% of federal 
government websites implement DNSSEC (Castro, Nurko and McQuinn 2017; APNIC, 2017).  DNSSEC 
implementation misconfigurations are common for many popular websites (Dai, Shulman, Waidner 
2016) The prevalence of DNSSEC implementation for hospitals and other healthcare entities is not 
known.    
To investigate the implementation of this important information security measure at healthcare 
institutions, this study will determine the prevalence of DNSSEC implementation on the websites of 
public hospitals in the state of Illinois.  
 
Methods 
This study used the DNSSEC evaluation methodology described by Castro, Nurko and McQuinn for   
Benchmarking U.S. Government Websites (Castro, Nurko and McQuinn 2017). 
The Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) hospital directory was downloaded from the IDPH 
website [https://data.illinois.gov/dataset/410idph_hospital_directory].  This directory included all 210 
licensed public hospitals in the state of Illinois as of September 27, 2017. 
Each listing includes the hospital legal name, city and county the hospital is located in, and type of 
hospital.  
IDPH defined hospital types are:  general hospital, critical access hospital (no more than 25 inpatient 
beds), long term acute care hospital (a hospital focused on patients who have an average hospital stay 
of more than 25 days), pediatric hospital (exclusively serves children), psychiatric hospital (a hospital 
focused on psychiatric care), and rehabilitation hospital (a hospital focused on rehabilitation after 
stabilization of acute medical issues).   
For each hospital on the list, the Google search engine (https://www.google.com) was used to identify 
the hospital website by searching for the hospital name, city, and state.  The hospital web site uniform 
resource locator (URL) was entered into the DNSSEC Debugger (https://dnssec-
debugger.verisignlabs.com/) developed by Verisign Labs for analysis.   
DNSSEC Debugger performs a step by step validation for the entered URL.  At each step, results of good, 
warning, or error are reported.  The presence of one or more errors indicates failed DNSSEC 
implementation.  For the purposes of this investigation, warnings were ignored. 
These tests were performed on December 11, 2017. 
The research protocol was reviewed by the Springfield Committee for Research Involving Human 
Subjects, and it was determined that this project did not fall under the purview of the IRB as research 
involving human subjects according to 45 CFR 46.101 and 45 CFR 46.102. 
 
Results 
Websites could be identified for all 210 hospitals in the study sample.  One hospital website was not 
functioning, so it could not be evaluated.   
Only one hospital (0.5%) out of 209 in this sample passed DNSSEC.      
 Discussion 
The prevalence of DNSSEC for hospital websites in Illinois, USA is extremely low (0.5%) when compared 
to all websites in the United States (24%) and federal government websites (90%) using readily available 
testing tools (Castro, Nurko and McQuinn 2017; APNIC, 2017).   
The reasons for this low prevalence of DNSSEC for hospital websites is unknown.  However, not using 
this technology may put hospital website visitors at risk of redirection to a fraudulent website, data 
interception, and data manipulation using techniques successfully used against banking and other 
websites (Fulton, S.  2015; Geer, 2015).  This potential has risks to the hospital in the form of damage to 
the hospital reputation and disruption of customer (patient) acquisition efforts.  Mitigating these 
potential risks to visitors and the hospital would be desirable.  
The cost/benefit ratio of DNSSEC is under debate because of costs, complexity of implementation, and 
the potential that improper DNSSEC implementation may prevent or delay access to websites (Lian et 
al., 2013; Cowperthwaite and Somayaji, 2010).       
   
Conclusions 
DNSSEC implementation for hospital websites in Illinois is rare (1 out of 209 hospitals).  This rate of 
DNSSEC implementation is much lower than a sample of all websites in the United States (24%) and the 
federal government (90%).  The reasons for the low prevalence of DNSSEC for hospital websites is 
unknown.  Further research is needed to better understand the significance of this data and the 
potential implications for the healthcare system.  
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